Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study
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Sue Onslow is Deputy Director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. Martin Plaut is affiliated with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London
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Newly elected South African president Nelson Mandela and deputy president Frederik De Klerk in May 1994.
EPA/Nic Bothma
It is a quarter of a century since the end of apartheid in South
Africa. But it’s easy to forget how complex, difficult and violent the
birth of full democracy really was. This was particularly true in
KwaZulu-Natal, where battles between the African National Congress (ANC)
and the mainly Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) claimed the lives of as many as 20,000 in the decade between 1984 and 1994.
In the three months before the first elections in April 1994 an estimated 1 000 people were killed.
The British and Americans were becoming increasingly concerned. The
conflict between Inkatha and the ANC was just one crisis: another was
developing with far right white extremists, who were threatening to
resort to violence.
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that there was an:
eight in 10 chance that violence will surge immediately before and during the election, when emotions are at their highest.
The agency also warned of the threat of a right wing coup, although
it considered this “unlikely”. (This CIA report is available in hard
copy only.)
As the situation grew increasingly tense, Britain’s Prime Minister
John Major and the US’s President Bill Clinton became personally
involved. Their interventions are shown in documents just released by the UK National Archives. The cover page of the CIA document.Author provided
The documents reveal just what a close-run thing the first truly
democratic election was, and how much time and effort Britain and the
USA spent ensuring that the voting went ahead.
Desperate times
Prime Minister Major took a phone call from Nelson Mandela on 22
February, in which the ANC leader described the situation as “very
difficult.” Major briefed Mandela on a meeting between the British
ambassador and the Inkatha leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi. He gave Mandela
a full account of the conversation, which he warmly welcomed.
On 24 February there is the first indication of a joint Anglo-American mediation effort to resolve the crisis. This arose during planning for a visit to Washington by Major three days later.
Our starting point is that the situation has now deteriorated to the
point where it seems very unlikely that left to themselves the South
Africans will reach an agreement that will enable to participate in the
elections. The consequences are likely to be very serious.
The British suggested that Major and Clinton might “offer their joint help to the transition process”.
The following day – having held discussions with Mandela, Buthelezi
and President Frederik de Klerk – the British ambassador in Pretoria,
Sir Anthony Reeve, was able to report that all three were prepared to go
along with the Anglo-American initiative, although with some
reservations. The ambassador concluded:
These responses do, I think, give us the green light to consult the Americans in detail on our thinking.
The proposal was discussed between Mandela and Buthelezi at a meeting
on March 1 and both leaders agreed to “explore” the possibility of
international mediation. Lord Carrington, who had negotiated the end of
Rhodesia and its transition to Zimbabwe in 1980, was on a lecture tour
of South Africa. He was approached by the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki who asked
whether he might act as one of a panel of mediators.
Others suggested were US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Tanzanian head of state Julius Nyerere.
There followed intensive discussions between London and Washington,
over how such mediation might work; indeed, Carrington and Kissinger
travelled to South Africa. In the end a failure to agree on the terms of
reference for the mediators, and South African government fears that
the elections might be delayed, put paid to the plan.
It has been claimed the crisis – the most immediate was that Buthelezi was threatening to boycott the poll – was resolved by surprising last minute mediation
by Kenyan Professor, John Okumu. Other Commonwealth envoys who had
excellent contacts with both the ANC leadership and Buthelezi, including
the late Ghanaian diplomat Moses Anafu, doubt this, arguing that forces
that led Buthelezi into the election were much bigger.
Indeed, Buthelezi’s brinkmanship had ensured key constitutional
concessions. Okumu’s intervention seems then a face-saving device for
the IFP leader. A joint statement was agreed between Mandela, Buthelezi
and de Klerk on 19 April, which allowed the election to take place just a week later (April 26-28).
Close-run thing
It had been a close-run thing and South Africa’s first truly
democratic election almost came to grief. But there were two more
potential obstacles.
In the tense run-up to polling day, a report
on the role of the apartheid state in stoking internal tension and
violence was published. The Commission of Inquiry Regarding the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, led by Justice Richard
Goldstone had been established in 1991: its report was published on 21
April 1994. Judge Goldstone’s investigations revealed that sections of
the South African Police had armed Inkatha, and pointed to attempts by
senior police officers to subvert the work of his enquiry.
The charges were explosive and for a while the judge and his family
were clearly at risk from white extremists. With de Klerk’s support and
the knowledge of Mandela, Goldstone, his wife and a “key witness” (a
former South African police officer) asked whether they might come to
Britain. John Major agreed, and they were given temporary asylum and a
safe house.
The second obstacle was the South African government’s clandestine chemical and biological weapons programme, known as “Project Coast.”
The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, contacted Washington about
the possibility of issuing a formal public protest unless President de
Klerk publicly admitted his government’s involvement in the use of these
weapons against ANC and Namibian prisoners.
The British had apparently intervened to prevent the proliferation
of these weapons to other rogue states or terrorist groups. On April 11
the US and British ambassadors delivered their protest to President de
Klerk – which apparently did the trick. There was an agreement that all
the chemical and biological systems would be destroyed and one of the
key South African experts, Wouter Basson, who had travelled to Libya on
several occasions, was subsequently prosecuted.
Political triumph
The April 1994 election proved to be a watershed for South Africa. In
technical terms, the election was a fiasco, but it was a political
triumph, according to the Commonwealth’s leading election official, Carl Dundass.
Inkatha’s surprising victory in Natal-KwaZulu strongly suggest Natal
“horsetrading” involved overturning an actual ANC victory to manage
anticipated post-election violence.
Despite all the violence, tension and drama the election ended
apartheid and allowed Major to phone Mandela with his congratulations – a
highly satisfactory conclusion to an intense period of international
diplomacy.
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